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In this paper we study a model where two spatially scattered sellers face 
a population of consumers dispersed over a given geographical area; they have to 
incur a transaction cost to place their purchase order . Moreover these consumers 
have imperfect knowledge of prices, but obtain full information about prices at 
the first shop they solicit. We study price competition between these firms.
The main outcomes of our analysis are as follows. First we show that whenever a 
price equilibrium exists for given locations of firms, it will necessarily dis­
play price dispersion. Second we study location configurations which ensure the 
existence of a price equilibrium. Furthermore we show that when it exists, a 
price equilibrium is unique. Finally we analyze firms revenues when merchants 
anticipate the consequences of their locational choice on subsequent price compe­
tition. Then we find that there is an incentive for a firm to get as close as 




















































































































































































SCATTERED SELLERS AND ILL-INFORMED BUYERS :
A MODEL OF PRICE DISPERSION
Jean J. Gabszewicz and Paolo Garella
In this paper we study a model where two spatially scattered merchants sell­
ing a homogeneous product, face a population of consumers dispersed over a given 
geographical area. If a firm receives a purchase order from a particular consumer, 
it delivers the product at home at no cost. However consumers have to incur a 
transaction cost to place their purchase order, proportional to the distance be­
tween their location and the firm (a possible interpretation of this transaction 
cost is the price of phoning or telexing the firm which has been chosen for pur­
chase) .
We also assume that consumers face imperfect knowledge of prices : while they 
know the distribution of prices, they cannot a priori identify which seller quotes 
which price. In order to identify prices at each shop consumers have to contact 
the firms. At his first search a consumer is then faced with the following alter­
native : either to buy immediately from the seller solicited at the observed price, 
or place the purchase order at the other shop while thereof covering the cost re­
quired by the second phone call and the price set at this other shop. Therefore, 
the firm which is first solicited by a particular consumer provides this consumer 
with a specific advantage over the other : he collects there full information about 
prices in both shops while he can simultaneously place his purchase order. As a 
consequence of this asymmetry, the order in which shops are solicited matters.
When a consumer will choose to solicit first a particular seller rather than the 
other ? We assume that the probability of observing a particular price is equal at 
each shop; then, a consumer first solicits the shop which is closest to him since 
this choice minimizes expected search costs. Therefore each seller according to 
his location enjoys a "natural" market : all consumers who are closer to him than 




























































































his shop even by quoting a price somewhat higher than the price set by his com­
petitor. The same consumers inertia is also observed at the other firm relative 
to its own "natural" market. How does price competition operate in such an en­
vironment is the question addressed in this paper.
In the present study we have chosen to approach this question in a model of 
duopolistic competition which borrows both from location theory, developed after 
Hotelling (1929), and from equilibrium models of price search, developed after 
Stigler (1961) (For location models see, for instance : d'Aspremont, Gabszewicz 
and Thisse (1979), Eaton and Lipsey (1975), Economides (1981), Salop (1979) or 
Stahl (1983); as for equilibrium search models, see Burdett and Judd (1983),
Carlson and McAfee (1983), Reinganum (1979) or Rotschild (1973)).
The main outcomes of our analysis are as follows. First we show that when­
ever a price equilibrium exists for given locations of firms, it will necessarily 
display price dispersion. Second we study location configurations which ensure 
the existence of a price equilibrium. Surprisingly enough, these configurations 
exclude the possibility that firms be too far apart from each other; then no price 
equilibrium would obtain. Furthermore we show that when it exists, a price equi­
librium is unique. Finally we analyze firms revenues when merchants anticipate 
the consequences of their locational choice on subsequent price competition. Then 
we find that there is an incentive for a firm to get as close as possible to its 
competitor.
It is interesting to compare the present study to another work that the au­
thors are completing in a companion paper (Gabszewicz, J. and P. Garella (1985)). 
The main problem considered here is treated there in a similar manner, with the 
sole exception that the information endowments of consumers about prices are repre­
sented by prior beliefs. The nature of the results is drastically affected by this 
change in the corpus of assumptions. This indicates that the hypothesis on infor­
mation plays a central role on the nature of competition.
2. THE MODEL
To start out we consider a classical Hotelling location model. On a line of 
length L , two sellers 1 and 2 of a homogeneous product with zero production cost, 
are located at respective distances a and b from the ends of this line 
(a + b < L ; a > 0, b 5s 0, a # L - b). Customers are evenly distributed along this 
line, and each customer consumes exactly a single unit of this commodity irrespec­
tive of its price. We depart from Hotelling by assuming that consumers while know­




























































































the probability of observing a particular price is assumed equal at each shop. 
Moreover we assume that customers may solicit (call) the shops at a cost increas­
ing linearly with distance while firms deliver the product at home at no cost.
From those assumptions it is easily seen that a consumer will buy from the 
nearest seller if, and only if, he finds out that the price in this shop is smaller 
than the price at the other one, plus the cost of soliciting this other shop. 
Formally letting t denote a particular customer on the line [0,L], all custo-
mers t in the interval A 1 Defi  [°- ^  [ (resp.
I” L + a — b
L 2 first






Then the cost c(t) of soliciting (eventually) the other shop amounts to 
c (t) — c • [ (L - b) - t] , if 0 < t < L ~~— — ,
and
c(t) = c • (t- a) , if — — - < t < L ,
where the scalar c denotes the cost, per unit of distance, of canvassing a par­
ticular shop. Finally customer t in Aj (resp. A£) buys from shop 1 (resp. 2) 
if, and only if, Pj < p^ + c(L-b-t) (resp. ^ P] + c(t-a)) where p^
denotes the price at shop i , i = 1,2.
Given (pj, p^, the set °f customers first calling seller 1 and placing
a purchase order there is equal to {t | p. <
coincides with the interval Aj j , with 11
T>2 + c(L-b-t); t € Aj} 
defined by
and
A1 1 = [°» Min { ”
a - b P2 “ P j + C(L - b)
}]■
Similarly the set of customers first visiting seller 2 and buying from him is 
equal to (t | p^ < Pj + c(t-a); t £ A,,} , and coincides with the interval & 2 2  
where
22 Max





























































































In a similar manner we can identify the interval of customers first visiting 
seller 1 (resp. 2), but preferring ex post to place their purchase order at seller 
2 (resp. 1), i.e.
12
f . [ L + a - b  f L +I resp. A21 = I--- -̂-- » Max{ --
c
a - b P2 - Pj + ac
11
}] A2 ^ A22)
Let us define Pj as the solution of the equation
L + a-b p - p + ac
i.e.
'1 p2 " — — — —  : if seller 1 sets a price exceeding pj , given p2 ,
no customer who first visited firm 2, is still attracted by the offer of firm 1.
s the solution <
P9 - Pj + c(L - b)
Similarly define Pj a of the equation
L + a - b
i.e. Pj = p2 + — — y — —  : if seller 1 sets a price exceeding pj , given p2 ,
some customers who first visited firm 1 start to place orders at firm 2. Notice
that pj < pj if a # L - b , as it is assumed. Hence in the domain [p j, p2]
demand addressed to firm 1 remains totally inelastic to p. , and consists.of all
L + a - b  _ n--- t.--- . In an analogous way, we canbuyers in Aj , i.e. demand is equal to
define p2 = Pj - c(L - a - b) and p2 = Pj + c(L - a - b) , and demand addressed to
We are now in a po-firm 2 remains equal to — k in the domain [p2> p2]
sition to derive the (contingent) demand functions to firm 1 and firm 2 , respect­
ively. We have
®!(P j » P2) =
P2 - Pj + ac
L + a-b
p2 ~ Pj + C(L “ b)
. „ _ ^ , c(L-a-b)if o < P j < p2 — -— 2— - ;
c(L-a-b) ,, ^ , c (L - a - b)
if p2 ------ 5----  < Pi< P2 + --- 2-----
, if P9 + -̂ -̂ — y — ~  F> j ̂  p2 + g (L — b ) ;
= 0 if p2 + c(L - b) < pj






























































































S i m i l a r l y ,  we get
2vf1,f2j = l - H2
F,
C , i f  0 <  p2 <  p j  -
L -  a + b 
2 , i f  Pj
c (L  -  a -  b )  ^  ^  _
2 ^  p2 <  P1
- l - P2 _
Pj  + ac
i f  n + c ( L “  a - b >
c i t  Pj + 2
= 0 , i f  Pj + c (L  -  a) <  p2 .
c(L -  a -  b )
2
c (L  -  a -  b )
The revenue fu n ctio n s  of the f i r m s ,  corresponding  to these con tinge n t demand func­
t io n s  w r i t e  as R j ( p j ,  p2) = Pj D jC p j ,  p2) and R2 ( p j ,  p2> = P2 D ^ P j ,  p2> , r e ­
s p e c t iv e ly .  T y p i c a l l y  t h e i r  graph co n s is ts  of a l i n e a r  segment connecting two 
q u a d ra tic  p ie c e s ,  as represented on F ig u re  3 . A (Nash) iprice equilibrium is  a p a i r  
(p * , P2) such th a t  Rj(P*> P*) >  Rj ( P i » P * )  » v Pi » and r2 (P*> P p  >  r2 (P* > P2> > 





























































































By contrast with Hotelling's model, the demand and revenue functions of the 
firms are continuous. But the present model shares with the Hotelling's one the 
property that neither the demand, nor the revenue functions are concave1.
3. THE EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
In the following we perform an analysis of the various properties enjoyed 
by a price equilibrium for the situation depicted above. We start by showing that, 
if an equilibrium exists, prices must be dispersed at equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 1. (Price Dispersion)
If a price equilibrium (p̂ , p ) exists3 it is defined by Pj = 3  (L + a) 3 
p* = — —  (equilibrium of type I)3 or by p* = ~ (L+ b), p* = — -
(equilibrium of type II).
Proof : The proof of the proposition proceeds by eliminating various domains of 
price pairs which are not admissible as price equilibria. Assume that (pj, 




j p j  I p2 + c < L - b )  ^  P j  >  P2 + c t L  2a— —  }  ;
{p , I p‘ * c(L7 ' b) > P] > p* - c(L"2a ' b ) } ;
/ 1 * c(L - a - b) s ^(p, I p2 ------2—  > p, > »}•




= { p2 I P* + c(L - a) > p2 > p* + ~-L- 3 — — }
= {P;
= {p:
* c(L-a-b) ^ ^ * c(L-a-b)p + ---- ,----  > P0 ^ P , ------ 9----
_* c(L- a-b) ^ ^
P i ------ 9----  > P9 ^ °}
1Notice that throughout the whole analysis we exclude the possibility that both 
sellers are located at the same place (a = L-b). In that case, for each cus­
tomer there is no cost advantage to sample one seller before the other. Accord­
ingly each seller should expect to be solicited and obtain half of the population 
of customers. However this sharing of the market is not consistent with our defi­




























































































(The graphs of the demand functions Dj(pj, P2) and D2(Pj, P2) » and the corre­
sponding domains of prices are represented on Figure 4) .
Figure 4 .
• • • • *First, no price equilibrium can obtain with Pj £ and P2 € D22 •
Indeed since demand is inelastic to price in the corresponding range for each
firm, revenue maximization in implies that p* = p* + — — — ^— —  , and
revenue maximization in D22 implies p* = p* + — ^ ^ — —  ; these two implica­
tions are clearly impossible together if L - b # a , as assumed. Similarly, no 
price equilibrium can occur with p* £ D jj and p* € D22 (°r the symmetric case,
 ̂ 3k 3|c Q ̂  ̂•• ̂  \
Pj £ Dj2 and P£ ^ D2p : w^en  ̂°22 * must *̂e e<lua-*- to Pj + -----2----  *
so that p* > p* , contradicting the fact that p* € Djj . Furthermore, an equi­
librium (p*, p*) with p* £ Dj j and p* £ ^21 ’ °r p* ^ D13 anc* P; e d23 •
is also impossible for evident reasons. We must finally exclude the case where 
p* € Dj^ and p* £ D22 (or the symmetric case : p* £ D j2 and p* £ D23^■ In
, . , , * * c ( L - a - b )  _ * * c ( L - a - b )
that case i t  must be that p2 = P1 + -------- 2--------  ’ SO taat P 1 = p2 ------------2--------
 ̂Dj^ , a contradiction. Consequently we are left with the only possibilities : 
(i) p* £ Dj2 and , simultaneously, P* ^ D21 * aru*/°r (ü) P* £ Dj j and, 
simultaneously, P2 £ D22 •
In case (i), since the pair (p*, p*)
the prices Pj and 
Max
pleD13
P2 must (in particular) 
Po " Pi + ac^ p2 ~ pl

































































































p„ - p + ac
Since Dj^ and D21 are ^oth semi-open intervals, the pair (pj, P2) can be 
an equilibrium only if they are interior to and D2 j , respectively.
Accordingly, first-order conditions must be satisfied, which imply that
3* ** ■§■ (L + a) and p* = C — —  (equilibrium of type I). In case (ii) , the
must (in particular) solve simultaneously
* c 
pl = 3






Since D1J and D23
p2 ” P 1 + C L̂ ”
) * P 1
L -
p2 ~ pi + c(L- b)>
* P2 ’
be
an equilibrium only if they are interior to Dj ̂ and Ü2  ̂ > respectively. 
Accordingly, first-order conditions must be satisfied, which imply that
p* = -̂  (L + b) and p* = C — —  (equilibrium of type II).
Q.E.D
We notice that an equilibrium of type II is simply an equilibrium of type I 
where a has been replaced by b . In the following we study equilibria of 
type I, but everything which is said or proved about these equilibria,finds its 
counterpart for equilibria of type II by permuting the parameters a and b .
For each of the following propositions (which characterize an equilibrium of type 
I), we shall provide in parenthesis their counterpart for an equilibrium of type 
II, dispensing with proofs.
Before studying the conditions under which the pair of prices (p*, P2) = 
(~~~T ’ C " ^ is an equilibrium of type I, we need the following
p2 3
( C
v pr Ri (3
V p r R 1 ( P 2
and assume a < -j ; then3 either
c(L - a - b) *\ ̂































































































V Pj 11 1 3







) >  V p*.
* c (L - a - b)
Pi +1 2 )
(the proofs of the lemmas are given in appendix).
Po) >
^2 ̂P j »
P2 =
Lemma 1 states that, if a < y , and if firm 2 plays the strategy 
— —  which is the best reply for player 2 in D2 j against
p* = ̂  (L+ a) (see proposition 1), the only strategy of firm 1 which can even­
tually beat p* is the best reply in against p2 , i.e. p2 + — — — ^ — —-
The two alternative profiles for Rj(pj, p*) are depicted in Figures 5.1 and 
5.2.
Figure 5.1 Figure 5.2
* _ c (L + a) 
31 3
Lemma 2 states that, if a < j , and if firm 1 plays the strategy 
, which is the best reply for player 1 in Dj^ against p2 c(2L- a)
(see proposition 1), the only strategy of firm 2 which can eventually beat p2
*̂ jk o ( L ci b )is the best reply in D22 against p^ , i.e. pj + ---- 2---- The two alter­






























































































We are now in a position to establish that the pair of prices
c(L + a) c(2L - a)\
3 ’ 3 )(pl’ p2} = ( is, indeed, a price equilibrium when some con-
ditions on the location parameters are satisfied. To get an intuition on the na­
ture of these conditions, we notice that for obtaining an equilibrium of type I, 
it is needed that the graph Rj(pj, p*) is as on figure 5.2 and, simultaneously, 
the graph of R^Cp*, P2) is as on figure 6.2. Otherwise at least one of the 
firms can yield a higher revenue by deviating from (p*, p p •
PROPOSITION 2. (Existence)
If a < y , there always exists a nonnull set of b-values for which an equi­
librium of type I exists at the corresponding pair of locations (a,b).
(If b < j , there always exists a nonnull set of a-ualues for which an 
equilibrium of type II exists at the corresponding pair of locations (a,b)J.
Proof : By definition, an equilibrium of type I is the pair of prices 
(p* > p p  = + a) , (2L - a)^ . By lemma 1, if a < y and if
R j(p*» P p  > ^l(p* + C 2— ~  » p*) * then R pP*> P p  > R P pi» P p  for a11 
Pj . Similarly, by lemma 2, if a < ̂  and if R^ (p*, p p  > R2 (p*, P* + ^ — —
then R^Cpp p p  > R2(p*, P2) for all P2 • Thus we are left with the problem 



























































































- 1 1 -
and
V P j:
*\Po) > R, v 2
c(L - a - b)
R2 (p*. p2) > R2 _* , c (L - a- b) P, + ---- J----
(1)
(2)
It follows from lemma 3 that given the location a , the set of b-values veri­
fying inequality (1) obtains as
B (a) = |b | 0 < L-a-b < - |  (a + L) + | \/(a+L) 2 + (L-2'a"F D=f e*
Let us show that for any pair (a,b) with b € B(a) , inequality (2) must also
hold. First notice that b £ B(a) =» — ̂  a < b , since b £ B(a) = * L - a - b < e * <
2 . . . .  <-j(L-2a) , where the last inequality follows from direct computation using
a < y  . Furthermore direct computation also shows that
p2
x ^ , c(L-a-b) c/T , x . c(L - a - b)
2-(2L- a) > pj + ---- 2----  = (L + a) + ---- -̂---
L + a ✓ , , ✓ L<=> — 2—  ̂  b and a -j
Consequently, b £ B(a) => p* > p* + — — — ^— —  . In turn, the last inequality
implies inequality (2) : given the continuity of I^Cp*, P2) and the fact that
R2 (p* » P2) > r2(p*, P2) for all p2 € D21> it must also be.that R2 (p*, P2> >
y, ( *  ̂ c(L- a - b)\ . ^ c(L“ a — b) • . . . . n
^ 2 v l ’ P l + —'— 2--------since Pj + ------------2-------  1S in t ^e c f ° sure ° f  R2i
In conclusion, for each location a < y , and all b £ B(a) , - a non null
set - , both inequalities (1) and (2) are satisfied, which completes the proof
of proposition 2.
Q.E.D.
PROPOSITION 3. (No Symmetric Equilibrium)
No -price equilibrium of type I exists if b < a (No equilibrium of type II 
exists if a < b j.
Proof : First assume a = b . Then, by proposition 2, an equilibrium of type I 
exists at the pair (a,a) if, and only if, a £ B(a) or, equivalently, iff 
e(a) = L - 2a < £* , where B(a) and £* are defined as in the proof of proposi­
tion 2. However, the direct comparison of L - 2a and e* shows that e* < L - 2a 




























































































no equilibrium of type I exists when a = b . Ib b < a , then e = L - a - b >  
L - 2a •=> L - a - b > e* , so that b cannot belong to B(a).
PROPOSITION 4. (Uni-city)
Q.E.D
Whenever a price equilibrium exists} it is unique.
Proof : Given a pair (a,b) we know from proposition 1 that there can be at most 
two price equilibria. But there cannot be a pair (a,b) for which both an equi­
librium of type I and an equilibrium of type II exist simultaneously. Indeed, 
from proposition 3, no equilibrium exists if a = b and, if a < b , no equi­
librium of type II exists while if b < a , no equilibrium of type I exists.
Q.E.D.
Until now we have analyzed the properties of price equilibria at given 
locations of the sellers. Whenever the firms are also allowed to choose their 
locations in addition to price, the link between the former and the latter choice 
is traditionally analyzed as a sequential game where first locations, and then 
prices are chosen. In this sequence both merchants can anticipate, when they 
choose their location, the consequences of their choice on price competition. 
Consider that seller 1 is allowed to choose his location a , given location b , 
in the range of a-values where an equilibrium of type I exists. Substituting equi­
librium prices (p*, p*) is his revenue function yields, as a function of' a 
only ,
Rj(a) = c(L + a)'
which increases monotonically with a . On this fact rests
PROPOSITION 5. (Clustering)
Given the location b of seller 2 , 
dRj(p*(a,b), p*(a,b))
in the set {a| there exists a type I equilibrium at (a,b)}, where p*(a,b) 




























































































Proposition 5 states that, if the effects of choice location on price 
competition is taken into account, there is a clear incentive for seller 1 to 
cluster together with seller 2 (a proposition similar to proposition 5 holds for 
seller 2, in the range of b-values for which an equilibrium of type II exists, 
given the location a of seller 1).
4. SUMMARY
In this paper we have considered a situation where the collect of informa­
tion by consumers creates an externality on the transaction costs required for 
buying a commodity : information comes out as a byproduct of canvassing the first 
shop. On the other hand each firm has initially a "natural" market : to the ex­
tent that buyers incur transaction costs proportional to the distance to the firm, 
all consumers closer to a particular firm first call that firm. The combined 
effects of these two features lead to a market equilibrium in which prices are 
necessarily dispersed.
Furthermore a market equilibrium can exist only if there is a significant 
asymmetry in the size of the "natural" market of each firm. This asymmetry re­
quires that firms are not located too far apart from each other. Then, the 
seller enjoying the larger natural market cannot benefit, at an equilibrium, 
from undercutting his rival's price; should he do so, the revenue increase due 
to a larger market share cannot be sufficient to compensate him for the loss due 
to a lower per unit price than at equilibrium. At the same time the seller with 
the smaller natural market prefers to capture part of his rival's clientele 
through a low enough price, rather than satisfy the demand of his own "natural-" 
customers at a higher per unit price than at equilibrium. This fact, in turn, 
generates an incentive for the "smaller" firm to cluster with the other, re­
ducing thereby the portion of the market which lies between the two firms.
In conclusion, it may be of interest to note that the manner by which the 
two sellers compete and the nature of a price equilibrium are markedly different 
from what Hotelling described in his original work ([7]), where he assumed con­
sumers to be perfectly informed. In that case, indeed, for a price equilibrium 
to exist, it is required that firms lie far apart from each other, otherwise 
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A P P E N D I X
LEMMA 1.




j , R, ( f  (L + a), p*) > Rj (Pj » P$) ,
i ■ R i( P, + — — 5--—  ■ P2) * R1 <p 1 ’ p2 '
* + c(L - a- b)
’ 2
Proof : In any case if a price pj verifies the property




where D jj , and Dj^ are defined as in Proposition 1. Let us show that,
if a < ^  , the solution Pj to problem (3) must lead to a revenue Rj(pj, p*)
which exceeds Rj(pj, p*) for all Pj in d jj » leaving us with either case (1)
or (3). First it is clear that p^ solution to problem (3) is equal to
* , c(L - a - b) . ■P2 + —-— 2---- ” » that ls >
~ c(4L - 5a - 3b)
P 1 " 6 ’
On the other hand the solution pj , say, to problem 2 is easily derived as
, c(5L - a - 3b)
P 1 ~  6




( P2 - Pl + ac^










( L + a - b  \



























































































Since the inequality a < y implies that pj < Pj , the concavity of Rj (Pj » P*)
in the domain D̂  j insures that R j (P j» P*) ^ R1 ( + ~ ̂  2 — ~  * P*) f°r
• call Pj £ D jj. On the other hand, and easy calculation shows that Pj = "3 (L + a)




Let p* = — —  j— - and assume a < y , then either
V p 2. R2 (p*’ ^ 3 — ~ )  > R2(p*’ p2^
(p*. P* + — - ~2a ' "b •') > r2(p*. p2)V p2, r2 lf1» h j
Proof : In any case if a price p2 verifies the property
Vp2, R2(pj, p2) > R2(Pj, p2)
it must be that p2 is solution of either
or









where D2j , D22 and D23 are defined as in proposition 1. Let us show that, 
if a < , the solution p2 to problem (3) must lead to a revenue R2(pj, p2)
which exceeds R2(p*, p2) for all p2 6 D23 , leaving us with case (2) or (3).
. 'v , _ , , „. . , * c(L“ â b)First it is clear that p2 , solution to problem (3) is equal to p} + ----2-----
so that we have necessarily that R^p*, p* c(L - a - b)




c(L - a - b)
2\y 1 ’ P 1 2
for all p2 £ D23> Since R2(p*, P2) is concave in the domain D23
































































































inequality must hold if the unconstrained solution ^ 2
. q ̂  ” b) • ,vP j ----— 2----- • An easy calculation shows that P2 =
ceeds p* - ^— —  if a < y . On the other hand,
that P2 = "§ (2L-a) is solution to problem (2), when 
the proof of lemma 2.
to problem (1) exceeds
c(L+a+3b) . ,-----g----  , which ex­
it is clear
a < , which completes
Q.E.D
LEMMA 3.
Given the location a , a < ., the set of b-values verifying
Rj (p*> Pp > Ri (p* + c(L - a - b) * P2) (A)
is equal to
B (a) jb I 0 < L - a - b < |(a + L) + | ^(a + L) 2 + (L- 2a) 2 D=f £*}
Proof : Substituting in Rj(pj, p2) for the values p*, p* and p* + j— —
(4) can be rewritten as
c(L+a) 2 ^ T c(7L-5a-3b)l (b + a - b^
----9—  * l ----- 6----- J ' ( 2 ) ■
Define e by £ = L-a-b and D(e) by D(e) = (6a + 3e) (4L - 2a + 3e) - 4(L+a) 2 
the inequality (4) holds iff, at the pair (a,b), D(e) < 0. Rewriting D(e) as
D(e) = 9e2 + 12 e(a + L) - 4(L-2a) 2 ,
we notice that D(e) < 0  if e = 0 and ^  > 0 if e > 0 , an inequality which
d^Dmust hold since L-b > a . Furthermore --  > 0 and
de2
D(e) =0 <*=> e =-|(a + L) ± | V(a + L)2+ (L - 2a)z .
Since e must be greater than 0 , we have only to consider the positive root
e* - - | (A+L) + |  ̂ (a+L) 2 + (L-2a) 2 > 0 ,
if a < ̂  . (The graph of D(e) is depicted on Figure 7). Accordingly, given the
location a , the set of b-values verifying
1 * *\^.D / * . c(L - a - b) *\Rj(Pj» P£̂  ^ Rj ^ 2  + 2 ’P2y
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